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Reporting on his visit to Austria in 1854, Virginian John R. Thompson 
complained that “the moment we got into the dominions of  the two-
headed eagle, I began to feel like a negro.” Not only was he forced to 
surrender his passport at the border, but before he could enter Vienna, 
Thompson had to secure “a pass, exactly such a one as Pa gives Lewis 
to go to Mrs. Jenkins’s, permitting us without molestation to enter the 
Austrian capital.” Rather than greater empathy with those whom 
they held in bondage, however, by the 1850s southerners like Thomp-
son were more likely to interpret their encounters with the repressive 
and undemocratic aspects of  European life as a troubling foretaste of  
what awaited them if  they allowed themselves to be crushed beneath 
the boot heel of  Yankee despotism. On the other hand, in words and 
logic reminiscent of  their defenses of  slavery, other antebellum south-
erners actually praised Austria’s rigid dominion over northern Italy 
for bringing order and elevation to a people who had once been en-
slaved by their own “ill-regulated and debasing passions” but were 
now, under Austrian rule, “rising to be a highly intelligent and moral 
people.” European social and intellectual currents have encouraged 
some notable southerners to think innovatively and subversively about 
their region, but at crucial junctures throughout their region’s history, 
white southerners have, as often as not, looked to Europe hoping to 
bolster and affirm the controversial values and institutions that have 
set the South apart from the rest of  America.1
Likewise, although their travel accounts and comments on things 
European often seemed to mark antebellum southerners as the prod-
ucts of  regional culture that was decidedly provincial, from the sev-
enteenth century to the twenty-first, significant and sustained eco-
nomic interaction with Europe has often helped to shape and even to 
sustain the South’s differences with the rest of  the United States. Jack 
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P. Greene has suggested that until they began their agitation against 
the mercantile policies of  the British Crown, each of  the American 
colonies remained “a discrete and largely self-contained political envi-
ronment” more closely connected to London than to “any of  its im-
mediate neighbors in America.” Greene’s observation was especially 
pertinent for Britain’s southernmost North American colonies, which 
accounted for nearly two-thirds of  the value of  the exports of  all 
thirteen colonies between 1768 and 1772, and were thus not only 
squarely “in the mainstream of  British-American development,” but, 
more broadly, as Peter Coclanis put it, a vital “expression of  the out-
ward expansion of  the European economy during the early modern 
period.” In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Coclanis ob-
served, these “exemplary mercantilist entities” drew “sizable .  .  . 
 intercontinental flows of  labor, capital, and entrepreneurship into the 
region and, with the establishment by Europeans and European Amer-
icans of  institutions and production platforms conducive to plantation 
slavery, impressive product flows out.”2
The plantation actually emerged as a unit of  proto-industrial ag-
ricultural production in the Mediterranean basin before it was trans-
planted to the New World by the great colonial powers of  Europe, and 
the allure of  European export markets played a pivotal role in making 
it the centerpiece of  the southern economy. Slavery arose in the sev-
enteenth century Chesapeake in response to the realities of  a rapidly 
expanding demand for labor and a dwindling supply of  Englishmen 
willing to work as indentured servants on the region’s tobacco planta-
tions. As Winthrop Jordan has shown, part of  the cultural baggage 
that English settlers brought to the new world was a predisposition to 
view blacks as different from and inferior to themselves. Fueled by 
religious as well as scientific influences, this prejudice could be traced 
as far back as the medieval era, and it became notably more apparent 
after sixteenth-century British encounters with West Africans opened 
up a Pandora’s box of  the sexual and moral anxieties captured so 
brilliantly in Shakespeare’s Othello. In the face of  the rapidly shifting 
economic and demographic realities they encountered in the New 
World, the English colonists fell rather unreflectively into an incre-
mental process of  African enslavement that was eventually institu-
tionalized in the Virginia slave code of  1705.3
With plantation slavery duly installed as the dominant component 
of  southern economic, and ultimately, social and cultural identity as 
well, the southern colonies were set on a decidedly different develop-
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mental path than the one taken by their northern neighbors. Both the 
concentration of  wealth in the hands of  slaveholding planters with 
little interest in economic diversification and community development 
and the attendant dispersal of  the population across the countryside 
clearly discouraged the development of  a broad public sector empha-
sizing education, communication, and transportation such as devel-
oped in the northern colonies. With its European economic orientation 
and its closely related social and cultural eccentricities, plantation 
slavery all but foreordained the South as the least American part of  
America even before the process of  constructing America’s national 
identity had gotten under way.4
The South retained strong economic ties to Europe throughout the 
antebellum era, its principal crops of  cotton, tobacco, and rice ac-
counting for 55 percent of  the value of  American exports between 
1815 and 1865. It was surely no mere coincidence that in 1825, the 
year that the first permanent white settlers began to transform the 
swampy alluvial wilderness of  the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta into Amer-
ica’s premier cotton producing region, 171,000,000 pounds of  said 
staple had been exported to Great Britain to feed the insatiable looms 
of  a rapidly expanding textile industry. By the end of  the 1850s, the 
whir of  these looms could be heard in the background as a prominent 
geologist predicted that within a century “whatever the Delta of  the 
Nile may once have been will only be a shadow of  what the alluvial 
plain of  the Mississippi will then be.  .  . .”5
The South was the world’s primary source of  cotton at the middle 
of  the nineteenth century. More than one of  its orators proclaimed, 
“Cotton Is King,” and one even crowed that without the fleecy south-
ern staple, “England would topple headlong and carry the whole civi-
lized world with her, save the South.” As Confederate emissaries ea-
gerly sought London’s all-important diplomatic recognition, however, 
they quickly came face to face with the reality that their region’s 
economic ties to the British textile industry had strengthened its de-
pendence on slavery and thus placed it at odds with the rising tide of  
abolitionist sentiment not only in Great Britain but elsewhere through-
out Europe as well.6
Still, one need not minimize the importance of  anti-slavery feeling 
in ultimately thwarting Confederate diplomatic overtures to note that 
these overtures came at a time when, unbeknownst to those who were 
still celebrating his coronation, King Cotton’s reign was already com-
ing to an end. The South had once supplied nearly 80 percent of  
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England’s cotton imports, but overall British demand for southern 
cotton was already cooling down by 1861. Moreover, the previous 
year’s bumper crop helped to cushion the impact of  the drastic reduc-
tion of  transatlantic cotton flows during the early years of  the war 
until increases in cotton production in India and elsewhere began to 
make up some of  the supply deficit in a slackening market. The war-
time loss of  southern cotton still hurt England’s economy, but it was 
offset, at least in part, by expanded northern demand for arms and 
other goods and England’s continuing need for northern wheat. Finally, 
the annual volume of  pre-war commerce between England and the 
northern states had to be considered, as did longstanding marketing 
and shipping arrangements virtually guaranteeing that, after the 
war as before, England’s access to southern cotton would still depend 
more on remaining in the good graces of  New York than of  Charles-
ton.
England’s diplomatic rebuff  carried a particularly sharp sting for 
many upper-crust southerners who had long claimed a spiritual kin-
ship with the English aristocracy, a sentiment that some of  their 
English counterparts actually seemed at times to reciprocate. The 
South’s economic ties to European textile manufacturers may have 
emboldened its secessionists and warmongers, but it was an earlier, 
largely imagined, pre-industrial Europe that encouraged southerners 
to see themselves as deeply, and ultimately, irreconcilably, different 
from their northern counterparts. The efforts of  southern colonists to 
adapt the fashions, furniture, and life styles of  the mother country to 
their new frontier circumstances fostered a sense that, as a Virginian 
put it, southern life was “as far as would permit, a continuation of  
English society.” As the nineteenth century unfolded, southerners also 
eagerly embraced the exceedingly dubious notion of  southern plant-
ers’ supposed descent from the aristocratic cavaliers who had fled 
England in the wake of  their defeat in the English Civil War by the 
Puritan ‘Roundheads.’ Not coincidentally, meanwhile, the descend-
ants of  the Roundheads had reputedly settled in New England, whence 
by the 1830s came a steadily expanding stream of  criticism directed 
at slavery and other aspects of  southern life as well. Although the 
claim to Cavalier descent arose originally in Virginia, where it may 
have contained the tiniest kernel of  truth, that kernel quickly swelled 
and burst into glorious mythical bloom across the entire region, show-
ing special appeal among over-proud South Carolinians and even crop-
ping up in depictions of  plantation society in Louisiana.7
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The Cavalier legend found its first full-blown literary expression in 
John Pendleton Kennedy’s 1832 novel Swallow Barn, which described 
life on the grand estate of  one Frank Meriwether, an exceedingly 
 appealing sort beloved by slave, kin, and neighbors alike. Like many 
subsequent literary treatments of  the Cavalier, however, Swallow Barn 
conveyed a certain ambivalence, for while the amiable Meriwether is 
surpassed by none in manners or congeniality, he is also in some ways 
a sad figure, one who seems more a man of  the past than the present, 
much less the future. His memory of  facts is far keener than his facil-
ity with new ideas and concepts, and he seems generally ill-suited for 
the rough and tumble of  a world where manners and congeniality 
matter far less than competitiveness, cunning, and a good head for 
figures. No such head, certainly, rested on the shoulders of  Colonel 
Cuthbert Dangerfield, who, in James Kirke Paulding’s Westward Ho!, 
refuses to keep books, has no idea of  how much he earns, owns, or 
owes, and shows no hesitation whatsoever in confessing himself  “ut-
terly incapacitated” to manage his own affairs.8
While many southerners crossed the Atlantic seeking affirmation 
of  their self-styled role as the standard bearers of  an enduring aristo-
cratic tradition, what they found was sometimes more troubling than 
reassuring. Michael O’Brien has argued that European romanticism 
captivated so many of  the southern gentry because of  its “special ap-
peal for those who thought themselves on the periphery.” Feeling more 
than a little peripheralized as the democratizing impulses of  the 1830s 
fueled the rising influence of  the upstart yeomen of  an expanding and 
an increasingly populous backcountry, they saw in contemporary 
 Europe what William R. Taylor called “a mirror which threw back a 
distorted image of  what was happening to the South, an image which 
threatened revolution, class warfare, and the extinction of  polite cul-
ture.”9
Prone both to melancholy and exaggeration, such southerners of-
ten grew fearful that what they perceived as the fruits of  several 
centuries of  European decline might be compressed into the span of  
a few years in the South, asking themselves if  the Cavaliers and other 
aristocrats had hardly survived, much less prevailed in Europe, how 
could they be expected to fare any better in America? Thus, in the 
mind’s eye, the ruins of  Rome became a Williamsburg in decay and 
contemporary Venice, the neglected port of  Charleston. Charlestonian 
Hugh Legaré likened the disunionist radicals who provoked the Nul-
lification Crisis of  1832 and challenged the primacy of  the old low-
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country planter elite in his home state to the Jacobins of  the French 
Revolution. After visiting Versailles, Legaré wondered why should “a 
society so charming and accomplished [as our lowland aristocracy] .  .  . 
be doomed to end so soon, and, perhaps, so terribly.  .  . . I see nothing 
before us but decay and downfall.”10
Not only did contemporary Europe provide distressingly little af-
firmation of  the viability of  their supposedly genteel and aristocratic 
identity, but it actually confronted members of  the South’s antebel-
lum agricultural elite with a jarring portrait of  industrial modernity, 
as it might one day play out in their own region, which was actually 
industrializing faster than any western society, save for Great Britain 
and the northern states. Southerners who traveled to England typi-
cally sailed from New York to Liverpool, the city where the price of  
southern cotton was thought to be set. South Carolina’s James Henley 
Thornwell was impressed by the docks and public buildings, but he 
found Liverpool and other European cities too “smoky” and “dingy” 
for his taste. He was shocked by the “immense poor population, ragged 
and dirty and begging for alms at almost every term.” Policemen were 
everywhere, he noted, “so as to be within a moment’s call for the pur-
pose of  suppressing mobs, riots and all disorders.”11
Surely, this was a world where the Cavalier had no place, but as 
sectional tensions mounted, concerns about his dysfunctionality in a 
modern setting gave way to strident boasts about his prowess as a 
warrior, a prowess presumably inherited from the Norman barons who 
had conquered England in 1066. Claims that the Cavaliers were gener-
ally of  Norman descent were, if  anything, even less credible than 
claims that southerners were generally of  Cavalier descent, (As one 
wag observed, had the participants in the Civil War been limited to 
the actual American descendants of  both the Cavaliers and the Round-
heads, the entire affair could have been accommodated by a single 
circus tent) but historical accuracy is hardly a priority when there are 
identities to be built, and as James McPherson has observed, the no-
tion that white southerners were lineal descendants of  the bold, fierce 
Norman Cavalier knights became “the central myth of  southern eth-
nic nationalism.”12
By the mid-nineteenth century, it was fashionable among both 
southerners and Europeans as well to use religious, cultural, class, and 
linguistic distinctions interchangeably with race. Thus, eager to shore 
up the shaky notions of  vast and irreconcilable cultural differences 
with the North, southern polemicists were quick to describe their pre-
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sumed Norman ancestors as “a race .  .  . renowned for its gallantry, 
chivalry, gentleness and intellect” and to insist that “the Saxonized 
Maw-worms creeping from the Mayflower have [no] right to kinship 
with the whole-souled Norman British planters of  a gallant race.”13
Much has been written on the popularity of  novelist and poet Sir 
Walter Scott among educated antebellum southerners, and Mark 
Twain famously blamed the Civil War on the South’s affliction with 
the “Sir Walter disease,” with its “sham grandeurs, sham gauds, and 
sham chivalries of  a brainless, and worthless long-vanished society.” 
Scott’s stirring depictions of  dashing and chivalrous, honor-obsessed 
knights clearly brought out the warrior-wannabe in the southern con-
gressman who announced his readiness to meet the Yankee foe “with 
helmet on, with visor down, and lance couched.” Scott’s novels also 
encouraged southern readers to see parallels between Scotland’s strug-
gles against English oppression and their own troubles with a North 
that was populated by the descendants of  the same Saxons who had 
abused the Scots so terribly. For the most part, southerners who read 
Scott did so uncritically, not because they wanted to lose themselves 
in his romantic tales but because they wanted to find themselves there, 
because of  what they wanted to believe about themselves as a noble 
and distinctive people. Hence, after devouring Scott, they even took 
merrily to describing themselves as “Southrons,” despite the frequent 
usage of  this term by Scots themselves as a derogatory reference to 
the Englishmen who lived south of  their border.14
When the Civil War began, of  course, Europe offered a number of  
contemporary examples of  struggles over ethnic nationalism, such as 
the Greeks vs. the Turks and the Hungarians vs. the Hapsburgs. Mean-
while, Poland’s uprising against Russia in 1863 struck a Richmond 
editor as “the same cause for which the Confederates are now fighting 
.  .  . against that crushing, killing union with another nationality.” 
When that fight was finally over, however, defeated and embittered 
white southerners turned once again to Walter Scott. Scott’s depic-
tions of  the ‘Lost Cause’ of  restoring the Stuart monarchs of  Scotland 
to their rightful position as rulers of  England as well doubtless encour-
aged southern whites to seek emotional comfort and regional affirma-
tion in a pervasive cult of  their own courageously pursued and honor-
ably relinquished ‘Lost Cause’ of  southern independence. 15
The white South’s ‘Lost Cause’ was no mere romantic flight of  
fancy, however, for beneath its melancholic surface pulsed a never-ex-
tinguished hope that it might yet somehow be regained. Committed 
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to restoring, insofar as possible, the traditional southern racial order, 
the founders of  the Ku Klux Klan appeared to draw some of  their 
inspiration from certain rites of  the old Scottish clans. The practice 
of  cross-burning did not actually become common, however, until the 
KKK was revived in 1915. At that point, theatrically-minded Klan 
leaders adopted the ritual of  using a ‘fiery cross’ to summon the clans 
that had been lifted from Scott’s poem “The Lady of  the Lake,” 
 incorporated into Rev. Thomas Dixon’s 1905 novel The Clansman, and 
then broadly popularized in 1915 in “The Birth of  a Nation,” D. W. 
Griffith’s phenomenally influential cinematic adaptation of  Dixon’s 
work.16
European influences also shaped the efforts of  those who sought to 
transform the South’s postbellum economy without undermining the 
region’s racial and political traditions. As Daniel Singal has argued, 
the postbellum crusade to construct a vibrant, dynamic, even domi-
nant industrial New South out of  the ashes of  the old agrarian order 
drew heavily on Victorian ideals, not as they manifested themselves in 
Victorianism’s declining years of  the 1880s, but in a time-warped ver-
sion of  the so-called British middle Victorianism of  the 1850s. The 
Victorian insistence on maintaining a rigid separation between the 
civilized and the savage offered an ideal rationale for the late nine-
teenth-century South’s emerging Jim Crow racial system. Meanwhile, 
the old Victorian optimism, the absolute conviction that diligence, 
discipline, and moral superiority could lead only to material advance-
ment, provided the ideal complement to the New South gospel of  
progress.17
While antebellum literary treatments of  the fundamentally non-
acquisitive Cavalier had frequently presented him as a hopelessly 
anachronistic figure doomed to extinction by an ascendant competi-
tive capitalist society, New South Victorians made capitalism the 
means by which the Cavalier ideals of  gentility, integrity, and noblesse 
oblige might be restored and preserved. Indeed, New South proponents 
like Henry Grady and Richard Edmonds never missed a chance to pay 
homage to the old Cavalier regime as “a civilization” that “has not 
been surpassed, and perhaps will not be equaled, among men,” while 
novelist George Bagby saw in the old Cavalier society “a beauty, a 
simplicity, a purity and an uprightness .  .  . a charm that passes all 
language at my command.” In short, in a pattern common to na-
tional identity-building elsewhere, the old agrarian Cavalier South 
became the glorious golden age of  the past, which the New South’s 
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industrial golden age of  the future promised to reclaim. Where the 
aristocratic Cavalier had been done in by forces that he could not 
control or even understand, his bourgeois New South descendants 
proclaimed themselves fully in command of  their region’s destiny.18
Just as the proponents of  an industrial New South drew on British 
antecedents to buttress and rationalize their efforts, the principal crit-
ics of  those efforts would do much the same. Many critics have con-
tended that for Allen Tate and his Nashville Agrarian colleague John 
Crowe Ransom, the difference between South and North was really 
the difference between “traditional European culture and industrial-
ized America.” In truth, of  course, antebellum southern travelers had 
witnessed an industrialized Europe well before there was a truly ‘in-
dustrialized America,’ but because Tate wanted a South that repre-
sented “permanent forms of  truth” that would remain “pertinent” 
even “under the varying conditions of  time and place,” he explained 
to Ransom in 1929 that “we must be the last Europeans, there being 
no Europeans in Europe at present.”19
Although Tate and Ransom were fixed narrowly on a mythical 
pre-capitalist Europe, more contemporary Europeans had contributed 
significant amounts of  both capital and expertise to the development 
of  a more modern southern economy. One English syndicate acquired 
2 million acres in Florida in 1881, and another whose investors con-
sisted of  “noblemen, members of  Parliament, country squires” and 
military officers purchased 1.3 million acres in the Yazoo Delta with 
an eye toward “a good outlet for pauper emigration.” In language that 
suggested a second age of  mercantilism, the London Standard an-
nounced in 1884 that “the time of  the South has come again” and 
reported that “company after company is being organized for the 
exploration of  the Old Southern States.” No one stoked the fires of  
economic revolution more ardently than Anglo-American journalists 
Edward L. Godkin and Frances W. Dawson, who, as C. Vann Wood-
ward observed, “spoke with the voice of  Manchester to the New 
South.” Dawson had actually served in the Confederate Army, but by 
the 1880s he was boldly suggesting in the Charleston News and Courier 
that “the importation of  about five hundred Yankees” was the key to 
making the South’s most southern city “throb with life and vivid 
force.”20
Britain’s demand for cotton had helped to fuel the drive to establish 
an antebellum cotton kingdom in the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta, and 
British investors figured prominently in the postbellum exploitation 
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of  that region’s timber resources. Once the Delta’s lands had been 
cleared and drained, its planters proceeded to establish centrally 
 supervised large-scale plantations that were, as one observer put it, 
easily “as efficient as any northern factory system” and therefore 
promised “profits without exception.” However much they may have 
fancied themselves the heirs to the spiritual legacy of  Sir Walter Scott, 
it was the results they achieved by adopting the hard-nosed, indus-
trial management style of  another Scotsman, Andrew Carnegie, that 
caught the eye of  the British capitalists who purchased some 40,000 
acres of  Delta land in 1911. Operating as the Delta and Pine Land 
Company, these investors proceeded to establish the world’s largest 
cotton plantation at Scott, Mississippi, where every facet of  their 
sharecroppers’ behavior was strictly regimented and scrutinized in 
excruciating detail. Although physical coercion was less a part of  life 
on the Delta and Pine Land Plantation than some others, whether in 
the cotton fields, the coal mines, or the lumber camps, across the 
South, European capitalists showed little hesitation in embracing 
the economic and labor control leverage afforded by the Jim Crow 
system.21
Even if  it sometimes appeared that Europeans were out to re-colo-
nize the South, most southern leaders actually seemed to welcome the 
prospect. In 1956 the South Carolina legislature went into special ses-
sion at a cost of  $30,000 to the taxpayers to relax the state’s alien-
property ownership restrictions in order to accommodate England’s 
Bowater Paper Company. For good measure, the lawmakers also ex-
empted Bowater from the more burdensome provisions of  the state’s 
newly enacted pollution-control statutes. As industrial pollution came 
under stricter regulation in their own countries, European manufac-
turers increasingly took note of  the industry-hungry South’s willing-
ness to accept environmental damage as simply part of  the cost of  
creating new jobs. When a German steel company opened a new plant 
on the South Carolina coast at Georgetown in 1969, local buildings and 
automobiles were soon cloaked in a thick dust that blanketed the area. 
Elsewhere, BASF and other European petrochemical firms also found 
southern officials remarkably tolerant on environmental issues.22
Prior to the 1960s, like most industrial investments in the South, 
European capital was concentrated in the extraction and processing 
of  raw materials or other low-value-added, labor-intensive industries. 
With the rise of  a more globally competitive manufacturing economy, 
however, European firms higher up the manufacturing food chain be-
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gan to feast on the South’s cheaper, non-union labor, lower taxes, and 
easy access to dynamic American consumer markets. Sensing an 
 opportunity, the southern states quickly established dozens of  indus-
trial recruitment offices throughout Europe. The most aggressive and 
effective pursuit of  European industrial capital came from South 
Carolina, whose promoters could boast by the end of  the 1970s that, 
in addition to plant investments from England, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Belgium, and France, there was more West German indus-
trial capital in their state than anywhere in the world except West 
Germany itself.23
In addition to seeking locations where government officials might 
be willing to overlook the occasional chemical spill or release of  exces-
sive sulfur dioxide, European manufacturers also worried about infla-
tion, tighter labor markets, and the recent resurgence of  leftist politics 
in their own back yards. Another incentive for European industrial 
investment in the South came in 1971 when the Nixon administration 
took steps to reverse America’s massive trade deficit by devaluing the 
dollar while simultaneously imposing a 10 percent surcharge on im-
ported manufactures. As one observer put it, for Europeans investing 
in the United States became not simply “more profitable,” but abso-
lutely “necessary,” and the U.S. dollars that had been piling up in 
European banks for so long began a steadily accelerating flow back to 
America. It was, allowed a jubilant British investment banker, “like 
getting Harrod’s at half  price.”24
Meanwhile, incoming European industries experienced that fabled 
southern hospitality first hand. Obliging South Carolina legislators 
expanded the exemption from duties on imported alcohol so that 
 international executives could drink as well abroad as they did at 
home. South Carolina officials built a $1.5 million docking facility and 
persuaded the U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers to dredge a half-mile 
access channel for the German steel firm at Georgetown. Michelin’s 
1974 announcement that it would build three plants in South Carolina 
in and around Greenville came after the French tire giant had received 
a five-year tax exemption. Michelin was also drawn to the South Caro-
lina upstate by the almost total absence of  labor unions. Michelin paid 
its South Carolina workers more than the prevailing local wage, and 
like its paternalistic textile mill predecessors, offered a number of  
non-wage incentives. Still, Michelin’s employees earned significantly 
less than northern workers in similar jobs, and only three years after 
the company began its operations in South Carolina, its officials joined 
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with local textile employers to protest recruitment of  a Phillip Morris 
tobacco plant that would bring 2,500 high-paying but unionized jobs 
to the area.25
South Carolina’s payout for landing a huge BMW automobile 
 assembly plant in 1992 was estimated to be as much as $150 million. 
It included free land and site preparation, tax exemptions and dis-
counts, free worker training, highway construction and improvement, 
free lodging for key BMW personnel, and a runway extension at near-
by Greenville-Spartanburg Airport. A year after BMW chose its South 
Carolina location, Alabama gave Daimler-Benz a subsidy of  $253 mil-
lion to open a Mercedes assembly plant near Tuscaloosa that would 
create 1,500 jobs at a cost to the state of  some $167,000 each. At the 
time, although Mercedes’s starting wage was well above the state aver-
age for manufacturing, it was still 30 percent lower than in Germany 
even without the additional benefits or, as one Mercedes spokesman 
put it, “the social baggage we have in Germany.” Despite Alabama’s 
dead last standing in spending for elementary and secondary educa-
tion, only a threatened law suit by an Alabama teachers group pre-
vented Governor Fob James from raiding the state’s school fund to 
pay off  a $43 million obligation to Mercedes in 1995. In light of  BMW 
and Mercedes’s moves to take advantage of  the American South’s 
large subsidies and relatively cheap labor, it was small wonder that 
German workers took to calling the region “our Mexico.”26
Although they have not been the least bit shy about cashing in on 
all of  the financial incentives they were offered, both Mercedes in 
Alabama and BMW in South Carolina have shown themselves to be, 
by prevailing standards at least, solid corporate citizens of  their states 
and communities. In fact, BMW even participated in the lobbying ef-
fort to persuade lawmakers to remove the Confederate flag from atop 
the South Carolina State House in Columbia. The influx of  European 
firms has also clearly influenced the local consumer culture, bringing 
far better selections of  beer, wine, cheeses, pastries, and the like to 
places like the old Piedmont textile belt. Still, those who predicted 
that European firms investing in the South would also introduce a 
more socially conscious corporate attitude toward worker benefits and 
a more generous perspective on the industrial sector’s revenue obliga-
tions to the state were soon disappointed. Why, after all, would the 
executives of  these firms move to re-create in their new locations many 
of  the conditions that had made them think twice about further ex-
pansion in Europe in the first place? Instead, having already enjoyed 
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a bit more of  European welfare capitalism than they cared to, they 
readily adapted to the South’s long-established, decidedly more busi-
ness-friendly version, where the welfare flowed primarily to the capi-
talist.27
As the global pursuit of  new industrial capital has brought massive 
changes to the southern landscape, southerners intent on documenting 
an enduring regional distinctiveness continue to pick and choose their 
European cultural and historical lessons quite selectively. This is par-
ticularly true of  certain ultra-conservative elements who, so it seems, 
would like to roll back most of  the changes that have come to the 
South in the last half  century. Spokesmen for the contemporary neo-
secessionist League of  the South have renewed the practice of  invoking 
Scottish tradition to legitimate their reactionary racial and cultural 
initiatives. The League of  the South’s web site has noted that “unre-
constructed southerners will find it difficult to miss the parallels 
 between the Scots and our Confederate forebears,” and the group’s 
obsession with the movie “Braveheart” seems all the more appropriate 
in light of  Braveheart star Mel Gibson’s recent, widely publicized 
drunken anti-Semitic rant. The league’s celebration of  southern ties 
to Scotland is actually part of  what is billed as a broader effort to save 
“true southerners” from “ethnic cleansing” and preserve “the historic 
Anglo-Celtic culture .  .  .” that has “given Dixie its unique institutions 
and civilizations.”28
In their move to promote southern independence, league repre-
sentatives have insisted that “American Southerners have much in 
common with the Scots and Welsh in Britain, the Lombards and Sicil-
ians in Italy and the Ukrainians in the defunct Soviet Union. All have 
made enormous economic, military and cultural contributions to their 
imperial rulers, who rewarded their loyalty with exploitation and con-
tempt.” The South is currently attracting Hispanic immigrants in 
huge numbers, and like some of  his right-wing European contempo-
raries, League of  the South president Michael Hill has cited the “huge 
influx of  non-white immigrants into both Europe and America that 
threatens to engulf  our historic populations and culture” and pro-
claimed his undying opposition to “the poison .  .  . being pumped into 
the West’s veins” by “Third World immigration.”29
Just as Hill and other white southerners have done so frequently 
in looking at Europe, Europeans hoping to affirm their own identities 
and values have, on occasion, taken a selective, de-contextualized view 
of  the South’s history as well. Don Doyle has pointed out that in order 
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to express defiance of  their northern antagonists, some in southern 
Italy even sport Confederate flag bumper stickers and wave the banner 
at soccer games. When Doyle asked if  the people of  the Italian South 
really knew what the flag meant, a professor from the University of  
Naples assured him, “Oh, yes, we know what it means.  .  . . we too are 
a defeated people. Once we were a rich and independent country, and 
they came from the North and conquered us and took our wealth and 
power away to Rome.”30
As I have suggested elsewhere, William Faulkner’s famous observa-
tion that “The past is never dead, it’s not even past” seems even more 
applicable to Europe than to the American South. White southerners 
who are still fighting the Civil War hardly seem unusual to people in 
Ireland who speak of  “King Billy’s” great victory on “the green, 
grassy slopes of  the Boyne” in 1690 as if  it happened last week, and 
the Serbs who are clearly still severely chapped about the outcome of  
the Battle of  Kosovo in 1389 make the “fergit hell” crowd of  southern 
whites look like a bunch of  historical amnesiacs.31
Regional distinctions clearly still matter throughout Europe, and 
while many Americans claim that the South is now indistinguishable 
from the rest of  the United States, from their more detached perspec-
tive, Europeans can still see the differences, and these differences are 
precisely what makes the South so fascinating to many of  them. Both 
the inexorable processes of  globalization and the ongoing efforts of  
the European Union to shape Europe into what is effectively a single 
nation (and, some think, a single culture as well) make the South’s 
historic refusal to sink quietly into the American mainstream seem not 
just relevant but, in many ways and however grudgingly, admirable.
Indeed, I would even go so far as to predict that, the more stand-
ardization and centralized authority that the EU undertakes to estab-
lish, the less difficult it will be for Europeans to relate to southerners’ 
historic aversion to externally imposed regulations and innovations, 
even those that might well be in their region’s own ultimate best inter-
est. If  so, perhaps it will not be long before we can at last stop talking 
about the southernization of  America and begin to consider the south-
ernization of  Europe instead.
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